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AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
On May 1, 1976, the Federal Aviation Administration ('FAA) imple-
mented an Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP) to identify de-
ficiencies and discrepancies in the National Air Transportation System.
The FAA requested pilots, controllers and others in the aviation system
to voluntarily submit information which would be used as a basis for
developing design recommendations for an improved future system. Because
of risks perceived in the voluntary submission of such information to the
FAA, many aviation organizations opposed the methodology. Thus, on
October 10, 1975, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
entered into an agreement with the FAA to act as a "third-party" for
the purpose of receiving, processing and analyzing the reports that were
submitted.'
In March of this year, NASA released a fact sheet to outline the
NASA design of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), its re-
lationship to the FAA's ESRP and how NASA will operate the ASRP, to
facilitate the flow of safety information, while protecting the identities of
those submitting safety reports.
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
1. Safety Reports
The ASRS is designed "to act as an early warning system." Through
*B.A., Chatham College; J. D., University of Miami; member of the Florida
Bar. The statements and opinions contained in this article are Miss Kent's own and
do not necessarily represent the opinions and/or conclusions of the Civil Aeronautics
Board or the Bureau of Enforcement.
**The assistance of Glenn H. Mitchell, J. D. Candidate, University of Miami
School of Law, is gratefully appreciated.
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the centralized collection of reports and safety-related data, it will hope-
fully be able to determine trends which may serve to alert the aviation
system to future problems.
The ASRS solicits reports from anyone in the national aviation
system who witnesses or is involved in an occurrence which is believed
to be a potential threat to flight safety. Prior to the implementation of
ASRS, a circular describing the reporting system and containing a report
form, will be sent by the FAA to airlines, fixed base operators and other
concerned organizations.
Those submitting reports to NASA will be asked to fill out the forms
as completely as possible. This will include an identification section
(which will be returned to the sender) since NASA has found that ex-
perienced data analysts must be able to speak to the originators of reports
to obtain the maximum benefit from the information.
2. Initial Processing of Reports
Upon initial receipt of a safety report, NASA is obligated to review
the report to determine whether it relates to a criminal offense2 or an
aircraft accident.' Screening of the report will be performed by a NASA
employee who is a qualified attorney and pilot. If a report refers to a
criminal offense, it will be forwarded, without further processing, through
the NASA Chief Counsel to the Department of Justice. If a report con-
tains information pertinent to an aircraft accident, it will be referred
to the National Transportation and Safety Board with a copy sent to the
FAA. In the case of a criminal offense or aircraft accident, the identity
of the reporter will be forwarded together with the report. In all other
circumstances, NASA will maintain the confidentiality of such individuals.
NASA will not screen safety reports for violations of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) since it is NASA's belief that such review
would seriously jeopardize the willingness of pilots and controllers to
report the conditions of situations which pose a threat to air safety. If a
violation of the FAR's is definitely uncovered during the report review
process, NASA will not notify the FAA pursuant to a special exemption
authority.
3. Report Analysis
NASA's objective is to have all safety reports screened, catalogued,
clarified and then deidentified within 48 hours of receipt. If the analysis
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of a particular report revealed that the situation was time-critical, the
report is "flagged" and pertinent report information will be promptly
forwarded to NASA.
Deidentified reports will also be prepared for entry into a computer.
This process will be handled by the report analyst who will make judg-
ments regarding the coding of information from the report. The coded
data will be entered into two separate computer files: the 45-Day File and
the General Data File.
4. The 45-Day File
The FAA ASRP waives enforcement action on many violations of
the FARs upon timely submission of safety reports to the NASA ASRS.
Since FAA may discover FAR violations through many additional
channels, the NASA ASRS had to provide a means to evaluate specific
incidents to determine whether a waiver is justified in an ASRS report.
Two methods have been developed to indicate participation in ASRS. The
first is the identity section of the report itself which is dated and stamped
by NASA during the review process. This identity strip is subsequently
returned to the originator of the report. The second system is the 45-Day
File.
The 45-Day File will maintain a record of each report received by
NASA and will contain only the date, time, location and occurrence of
the incident described by the report. To be used by FAA, the FAA must
determine through independent sources that an alleged violation of the
FARs 'has occurred and that enforcement action might be warranted. The
FAA must then approach NASA and request whether a safety report has
been filed. If the incident has been reported, or if the FAA neglects to
query NASA within 45 days after the incident occurs, FAA enforcement
action will not be considered. An additional feature of the 45-Day File is
that it offers protection to any individual associated with a reported action
notwithstanding the fact that he was not the originator of the report.
5. The General Data File
The General Data File in the ASRS will allow sophisticated cross-
referencing of data obtained from individual reports. The computer will
search periodically and automatically for trends and hazards in the in-
creased body of reports. The file is programed to protect the individuals
who were the source of such data and a specific occurrence cannot be
tracked back to a report originator.
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FAA Aviation Safety Reporting
Program Waiver Policy
The FAA Program applied to that part of the National Air Transporta-
tion System involving the safety of aircraft operations. Any person who
observes or is involved in any incident which poses a threat to aviation
safety, should file with NASA, within five days, a complete written report.
If the filing requirements are properly observed, an individual preserves
the waiver of disciplinary action applicable to the particular occurrence.
However, there are certain exceptions to the waiver policy. The exceptions
pertain to incidents involving reckless operations, gross negligence, willful
misconduct, criminal offenses and aircraft accidents.
To clarify the meaning of reckless operations, gross negligence and
willful misconduct, the FAA has provided the following examples:
(1) Intentional buzzing dangerously close to persons or property.
(2) Intentional operation of an aircraft in instrument flight rule
weather conditions without proper air traffic control clearances
or authorization.
(3) Knowingly performing aerobatic flight within a control zone or a
federal airway.
(4) Intentional unauthorized descent below published decision height
or minimum descent altitudes while conducting an actual instru-
ment approach.
(5) Knowingly executing an unauthorized instrument approach in
controlled air space.
(6) Intentional operation of an aircraft that is substantially over-
weight.
ASRS Schedule and Review
ASRS is scheduled to begin receiving safety information and reports
on April 15, 1976. Reports summarizing ASRS operations will be pub-
lished at three-month intervals. In June, 1977, a comprehensive analysis
and evaluation of ASRS will be performed by NASA in connection with
an advisory subcommittee to determine needed changes to the ASRS de-
sign and operation. A second comprehensive review is planned for June,
1979.
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CAB LIABILITY AND CLAIM RULES AND
PRACTICES INVESTIGATION
On March 22, 1976, the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) issued its
decision in CAB Order 76-3-139 which represented the Board's first
overall examination of air carrier rules and practices bearing upon freight
liability for claims. The Board had, on previous occasions, reviewed spe-
cialized areas of carrier freight tariffs in other contexts, but the instant
decision evinces an exhaustive study of this area.4
The investigation was instituted by CAB Order 70-7-121 (July 24,
1970) and was later broadened by CAB Orders 70-9-159 (September 3,
1970), 71-3-108 (March 18, 1971), 71-6-38 (June 7, 1971) and 71-7-116
(July 21, 1971). The examination encompassed the rules of all United
States carriers. After extensive public hearings which incorporated partici-
pation by carriers, shippers, shipper organizations, local governmental
bodies and federal agencies, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found
many carrier rules to be unlawful. The Board decided sua sponte to review
the ALJ's Initial Decision based upon the importance of the issues raised
in the proceeding.5
The Board made various findings in its decision. The threshhold
question regarding the Board's authority was answered in the affirmative
and the Board found that it was authorized to examine carrier liability
and claim rules and to prescribe lawful rules without making simultaneous
findings with respect to rates where the rules have been found to be
unlawful.
6
In its decision, the Board found a standard, which absolves a carrier
from liability except in case of negligence, to be unlawful. Prior to this
proceeding, air carriers had adopted the standard of the rule recommended
by the Board's Bureau of Economics. The rule, commonly referred to
as the "due diligence" rule, essentially provided that carriers were liable
for damages if the caused occurrence took place during the transportation
covered by the airbill. 7 In its discussion of the prior rule, the Board noted:
. . while the due diligence rule requires the airline to establish that
it exercised care, disputes as to the degree of care which it took or
should have taken will still result. The vagueness of the term "all
necessary measures" in itself suggests the difficulties of proof. And
the alternative clause of the rule, permitting the carrier to show
that it was "impossible" for it to take "all necessary" measures,
raises additional and difficult questions (CAB Order 76-3-139 at p. 8).
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Thus, the Board found that ". . a lawful rule must impose a standard
of strict liability." This standard was adopted by the Board subject only
to the following specified exceptions:
Rule 30
(A) Exclusions From Liability
(1) The carrier shall not be liable for loss, damage, delay, or
other result caused by:
(a) Acts of God, perils of the air, public enemies, public
authorities acting with actual or apparent authority
in the premises, authority of law, quarantine, riots,
strikes, civil commotions, or hazards or dangers in-
cident to a state of war.
(b) The act or default of the shipper or consignee.
(c) The nature of the shipment, or any defect, character-
istic or inherent vice thereof.
(d) Violation by the shipper or consignee of any of the
rules contained in the tariff or other applicable
tariffs, including, but not confined to, improper or
insufficient packing, securing, marking, or address-
ing, and failure to observe any of the rules relating
to shipments not acceptable for transportation or
shipments acceptable only under certain conditions.
(e) Compliance with delivery instructions from the ship-
per or consignee or noncompliance with special in-
structions from the shipper or consignee not author-
ized by applicable tariffs.
In addition, the Board reviewed carriers tariffs which contained
clauses exculpating carriers from liability for special or consequential
damages. The general standards which had previously been in effect re-
lieved the carrier of liability even where the carrier had prior knowledge
that special or consequential damages might be incurred. The Board
found this kind of rule to be unlawful and prescribed the following:
The carrier shall not be liable for special or consequential
damages where total damages (i.e., special or consequential dam-
ages combined with any other damages for which the carrier is
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liable) would exceed the carrier's normally assumed monetary liabil-
ity as set forth in Rule 32, unless a higher value is declared on
the airbill and the additional transportation charge assessed by the
carrier is paid. In no event shall the carrier's liability for special or
consequential damages exceed such higher declared value.
The Board also ordered an increase in the per pound amount which
United States air carriers must pay for loss, damage or delay when the
shipper chooses not to pay for additional coverage. The Board maintained
that the present amount, fifty cents per pound, was unreasonably low. A
new minimum figure was established, $9.07 per pound, and it is expected
to cover a larger portion of amounts claimed by shippers.8 The "$9.07
Rule" was described by the Board as an interim measure to remain in
effect pending further study of its effectiveness.
ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION CASE
On March 12, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of Enforcement
(BOE) of the Civil Aeronautics Board docketed a petition for enforcement
against Braniff Airways, Incorporated (Braniff) and certain individually
named respondents (hereinafter "Braniff parties") in CAB Docket 26364.
The petition was based upon the complaint of an Enforcement Attorney,
and incorporated a previously filed third-party complaint of the Aviation
Consumer Action Project.
The complaint against Braniff and Braniff parties alleged violations
of Section 407 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (Act)
and Part 241 of the Board's Regulations.9 Such violations were claimed
to have arisen due to Braniff's failure to accurately set forth in its general
books of account and subsequent failure to properly report to the Board,
a $40,000 corporate campaign contribution made to a political committee
in 1972 supporting the re-election of the President Richard M. Nixon.
The Bureau of Enforcement conducted an extensive investigation of this
matter which resulted in charges of failure to report and properly account
for the sale of approximately 3,625 Braniff airline tickets allegedly result-
ing in proceeds of between $641,000 and $927,000. BOE requested extra-
ordinary relief in its complaint relying in part upon allegations that the
Braniff parties attempted to conceal information related to the unaccounted
for tickets by providing false and/or no information to PBO Special Agents
during the Braniff investigation. 10
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On March 23, 1976 the Board entered an Order to Cease and Desist
against Braniff and all Braniff parties in CAB Order 76-3-146. The Order
incorporated a record civil penalty settlement of $300,000 and the entry
of a civil injunction (as soon as the matter might be heard) in the federal
district court for the Northern District of Texas. The consent injunction
will prohibit future violations of Section 403(b) of the Act (49 U.S.C.
1473(b)) through rebating and ticket discounting practices, whether en-
gaged in directly or indirectly and whether through one or more of the
following enumerated devices or otherwise:
(1) accepting or receiving less compensation for tickets than the
lawful tariff price printed thereon;
(2) providing free tickets to ineligible persons;
(3) selling or honoring tickets at special fares where conditions gov-
erning their use are not present;
(4) permitting exchange or reissuance of tickets without requiring
payment of additional amounts due;
(5) providing valuable goods or services free in connection with the
use of tickets; and
(6) making payments to or for the benefit of a ticket agent where
there is reason to know that such agent will use such payments
for rebating purposes.
The Board's order provides further that neither the unlawful con-
tributions nor the excessive payments to travel agents will be recognized
in future fare cases so that these costs will not be passed on to the con-
sumer in the form of higher ticket prices.
THE ADVANCED BOOKING CHARTER
On February 11, 1976, the Civil Aeronautics Board (Board) pro-
posed yet another form of charter service to be entitled the "Advance
Booking Charter" (ABC).11 Similar to prior charter proposals, the ABC
is designed to provide additional opportunities for the traveling public
to obtain low-cost air transportation.
The proposed ABC charter concept has been adopted from the ABC
charters which are presently available to most Europeans and Canadians.
In contrast to the so-called "Affinity" charter concept, the ABC passenger
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would not be required to be a member of any previously established group
or organization, and would be able to purchase round-trip charter air
transportation from an independent tour operator or travel agent in
advance of the flight date so that such passenger could be listed as travel-
ing thirty (or in certain cases sixty) days before the flight's departure.
Unlike the Travel Group Charter (TGC) participant, the price for the
air transportation would be fixed rather than adopting the variable pric-
ing concept which fluctuates with the number of passengers actually
aboard the flight. In addition, the proposed ABC does not contain require-
ments that a passenger purchase ground accommodations or "tour
packages" and would not establish a minimum fare level.
The Board's proposal would authorize both regularly scheduled and
supplemental United States air carriers and foreign air carriers to provide
the new charter service. The Board has noted that it does not expect any
undue diversion of passenger traffic from regularly scheduled service since
such service will continue to :be more attractive than the ABC for business
and other travelers who need routing flexibility and scheduling in their
travel arrangements.12
The following fact sheet regarding ABCs was circulated by the Board
at the time of its proposal:
1. Purpose
The ABC regulation is designed to increase the availability of
low-cost charter air travel by authorizing the operation of a new
class of charters. The Board proposed that, in the interests of
promoting charter travel to certain European countries,"3 more
restrictive provisions could be applied to ABC's to those European
countries in an effort to achieve closer harmonization with existing
European ABC rules.
2. The Charter Operator
ABC's will be arranged by and sold through independent charter
tour operators.
3. ABC Costs
The Board has proposed no minimum price on the cost of an ABC
participants round-trip seat.
4. No "Tour Package" Requirement
ABC participants would not be required to purchase any services
or accommodations in addition to their round-trip air transporta-
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tion. However, the marketing of an ABC as part of a tour pack-
age would not be forbidden either. Thus, ABC operators would be
afforded the maximum flexibility in fashioning charter packages
responsive to the demands of the traveling public.
5. Round-Trip Requirement
The proposed ABC incorporates a round-trip group travel require-
ment. However, the Board specifically solicited comments on
allowing individual participants who depart with one ABC group
to be "intermingled" on their return flight with another ABC
group organized by the same operator.
6. Minimum Duration
The Board has proposed no minimum duration on ABC's, except
with regard to certain European countries, designated in the pro-
posed rule, for which the minimum duration proposed would be
7 days.
7. Advance Purchase
ABC participants would be required to purchase their charter
tickets in advance. Charter operators and direct air carriers would
be required to file a passenger list no later than thirty days prior
to departure for most ABC's. For ABC's to certain European coun-
tries this advance sign-up period would be sixty days.
8. Substitution
With the exception of certain European ABC's, the Board proposed
to allow operators to find substitutes for up to 15 percent of the
participants any time prior to departure.
The Board has also requested comments on a variety of alternative
substitution provisions, and on the possibility requiring ABC
operators to offer passengers risk-of-cancellation insurance.
9. Termination
The proposed ABC regulation is experimental. It will terminate
on March 31, 1981, unless extended by the Board.
Public comment has been invited on the proposed charter guidelines
and all comments will be reviewed prior to the issuance of the final ABC
rule.
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Copies of the newly proposed Advance Booking Charter rules may be
obtained by writing the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1825 Connecticut Avenue,
N. W., Washington, D. C. 20428.
TIA-SATURN MERGER APPROVED
By unanimous decision on March 19, 1976, the Civil Aeronautics
Board approved the acquisition and merger of Saturn Airways (Saturn) by
Trans International Airlines (TIA) in CAB Orders 76-3-126 and 76-3-127.
Both TIA and Saturn are supplemental air carriers.14 The merger
agreement provides for Saturn to be merged with TIA, a carrier owned
by Transamerica Corporation. All outstanding shares of common stock of
Saturn will be exchanged for shares of common stock of Transamerica
Corporation.' s
TIA is based in Oakland, California. It currently has operating au-
thority to transport passengers in the Transatlantic market, and passengers
and cargo domestically, in the Caribbean, Transpacific, Central and South
America. TIA also holds worldwide military air transportation authority
and is the largest supplemental air carrier by virtue of operating revenues
and total business investment.
In reaching its decision, the Board reversed the initial decision of a
CAB Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ had placed controlling
weight upon the form of license or type of carrier involved in the merger
rather than upon the character and nature of the competitive market in
which the supplemental air carriers operate. The Board disagreed with
the ALJ's analysis, noting:
• . . [The ALJ] failed to give due consideration to the full scope of
effective competition which, in fact, exists between and among the
scheduled and supplemental carriers, both foreign and U. S. flag.
Furthermore, implicit in [the ALJ's] decision is the notion that com-
petition within the existing supplemental industry must remain static
notwithstanding the Board's regulatory ability to enlarge or enhance
competition within that industry as economic circumstances may re-
quire.
The Board found that the elimination of one corporate entity would
not reduce the competitive environment since the direct competition be-
tween the two carriers was not substantial. Moreover, the Board indicated
that the ranks of the U.S.-flag supplemental industry would not be irre-
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mediably reduced by Board approval of the agreement. The Board viewed
the expansion of authority of existing supplementals and/or authorization
of new or more effective supplementals to be a vehicle to stimulate new
competition and one of many means which the Federal Aviation Act
places at the Board's disposal to deal with dislocations which might affect
the availability of low-cost air transportation.
NATIONWIDE CONFLICT ALERT
The Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) an-
nounced on January 12, 1976, that the FAA had completed the installa-
tion of a national conflict alert system which flashed warning signals on
radar displays used by air route traffic controllers. The signals alert con-
trollers when aircraft are projected to be in possible conflict in air transit.
The conflict alert system is a computer program that has been added
to central computers at twenty Air Route Traffic Control Centers in the
continental United States. The Control Centers provide service to air-
craft flying under instrument flight rules (IFR) between airports. The
system is capable of projecting what an aircraft's flight path will be in
the upcoming two minutes. When flight paths are projected to be closer
than the requisite horizontal and vertical minimums, the data tags identi-
fying the aircraft start to 'blink and the words "conflict alert" appear be-
side a separate display of aircraft identities. 16 This alerts the controller
to the possibility of a conflict and allows sufficient time for radio contact
with one of the affected pilots in order to provide new headings and/or
altitudes to keep aircraft safely separated.
By January 12, 1976, all twenty Air Route Traffic Control Centers
had completed the initial phase of the program which was to implement
conflict alert in the high altitude sectors above 18,000 feet. In addition,
half of the centers had installed an operational system above 12,500 feet.
SPACE SHUTTLE TESTS
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) an-
nounced on March 25, 1976, that significant benefits to American civil
aviation might result from its reusable Space Shuttle program. In the
near future, the Space Shuttle will conduct operational tests of an ad-
vanced electronic flight control system for use in civil aircraft. In addition,
Space Shuttle research is providing significant advances in structural ma-
terials technology for aerospace manufacturers.
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The Shuttle's electronic flight control system, if successful, will re-
place present technology's heavy, mechanical backup control systems thus
reducing the weight of the aircraft. The reduction in aircraft weight
would ultimately reduce fuel consumption and the new electronic system
would allow development of more flight-efficient aircraft designs.
1 7
The Space Shuttle will also have an integrated electronic system
with central data processing which can be linked to ground navigation
and mission control. Such techniques are directly applicable to an inte-
grated air traffic control system.
WIND SHEAR 'FORECASTING
Wind shear is a phenomenon in which the wind speed or direction
varies significantly with changes in altitude. Such unexpected changes can
be hazardous to aircraft operations at low altitudes on approach to and
departure from airports. Thus, the Federal Aviation Administration of
the U. S. Department of Transportation and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration of the U. S. Department of Commerce jointly
sponsored a meeting to discuss the possibilities of wind shear forecasting.
A major objective of the meeting was to discuss the future imple-
mentation of wind shear forecasting at certain selected East Coast airline
terminals. Such forecasting would initially -be instituted on an experi-
mental basis until such time as the accuracy of the reporting could be
verified.
Additional items on the agenda included a discussion of general
characteristics of low-level wind shear, a review of the FAA Wind Shear
Program Plan and the requisite research needs for improving wind shear
forecasting. The meeting was attended by the FAA, National Weather
Service, Wave Propagation Laboratory, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, U.S. Air Force, National Transportation Safety Board,
Air Transport Association and various airline representatives. Further in-
formation about the meeting may be obtained from the Office of Aviation
Affairs, Washington, D. C.
TIME LIMITS ON RULEMAKING PETITIONS
In response to petitions filed by public interest groups and recom-
mendations contained in the December, 1975 'Report of -the Advisory
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Committee on Procedural Reform, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued an
amendment to Parts 302 and 399 of its Economic Regulations (14 C.F.R.
302, 399) which will establish a 30 day period for the filing of answers
to petitions for rulemaking and a 120 day period thereafter for Board
action. The Board announced its new policy on March 10, 1976, and
noted that such a policy represented the initial step toward expediting
CAB proceedings and providing the general public with a definite time
framework for Board action. The Board emphasized the experimental
nature of its decision, stating that some modification of its plan might
become necessary in the future in light of actual experience. The effective
date of the amendment was stayed by the Board for 60 days in order
to clear an existing backlog of petitions which have yet to be acted upon
or disposed of.
RECENT CASES
Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 13 Avi. 18,207, violations of the
safety provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, imply a private
right of action; Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 13 Avi. 18,223, cause
of action for wrongful death accrues at the date of death and the two-year
statute of limitations begins to run on that date, rather than from the
time the person entitled to sue discovers the particular cause of death in
Florida; Tames v. Yugoslav Airlines, 13 Avi. 18,228, Warsaw Convention,
as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement, does not require that a
passenger ticket give notice of the Convention's two-year statute of limita-
tions; Humphreys v. Tann, 13 Avi. 18,229, a uniform federal rule of con-
tribution and indemnity among joint tortfeasors should be applied in
wrongful death actions arising from a midair collision rather than con-
flict of law principles to select and apply the proper law, and the ap-
portionment between joint tortfeasors should be on a comparative negli-
gence basis; Junco v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 13 Avi. 18,243, law of New
York where decedent had resided was applicable to a wrongful death ac-
tion rather than the law of Florida where the accident had occurred;
State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 13 Avi. 18,257,
the Civil Aeronautics Board is not required to issue an environmental
impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 before permitting the air transportation of special nuclear
materials (SNM). The board is merely enforcing the directives of other
agencies; Air Freight Haulage Co., Inc., v. Ryd-Air, Inc., 13 Avi. 18,351,
agreement between an air carrier's subsidiary acting as agent in providing
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terminal and cartage services was not an agreement between "air car-
riers" as defined by the Act so that contracting parties would be im-
munized by the Civil Aeronautics Board from an antitrust suit by a ter-
minated freight handler; Iberia Air Lines of Spain v. Nationwide Leisure,
Corp., 13 Avi. 18,363, enforceability of a contract clause is a matter for
judicial decision, rather than within CAB's primary jurisdiction, when the
reasonableness of a rate or rule is not at issue.
CONCORDE OPERATIONS
On February 4, 1976, the U. S. Secretary of Transportation granted
British Airways and Air France temporary landing rights to the Concorde
at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport and Dulles Inter-
national Airport near Washington, D.C. The Secretary's decision allowed
for a sixteen-month trial period beginning May 24, 1976 which would
permit the Federal Aviation Administration to conduct noise studies to
determine any detrimental repercussions. The Secretary's decision was
based on a public hearing held in Washington, D.C. on January 5, 1976,
an environmental impact statement prepared by the FAA, and written
submissions of interested persons. If the service starts, the United States
operation will follow in the footsteps of the Paris to Rio de Janeiro pas-
senger service that went into effect on January 21, 1976.
However, the Concorde's troubles are far from over. In response to
the Secretary's decision, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
which has jurisdiction over Kennedy Airport, voted on March 11, 1976
to ban the Concorde from the airport until a six month evaluation
could be made of operations at Dulles and at airports in London and
Paris. Both Air France and British Airways countered by filing suit in
the Federal District Court in 'Manhattan. The airlines contend that the Port
Authority action raises both constitutional and treaty problems, and also
has a substantial adverse effect on foreign relations.
On March 5, 1976, a petition was filed by the State of New York
(C.A.D.C. 76-1213) for direct review in the United States Court of Ap-
peals of the decision by the Secretary of Transportation. 49 USC, Section
1486 establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Court of Ap-
peals to affirm, modify, or set aside any order issued by the Secretary of
Transportation. A similar petition (C.A.D.C. 76-1105) was filed on
February 4, 1976 by the Environmental Defense Fund in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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One legal hurdle to starting Concorde operations at Dulles was re-
moved on March 12, 1976 in the case of Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County, Virginia, et at v. John L. McLucas, et al. 13 Avi. 18, 354. Judge
Parker of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed a request for relief and denied a motion for preliminary in-
junction to land in the U.S. by holding that the Secretary of Transpor-
tation's decision on February 4, 1976 to permit the Concorde to operate
commercially in the United States is an order that is reviewable exclu-
sively in the United States Court of Appeals.
Despite efforts by representatives of the British and French Govern-
ments, New York Governor Carey signed a bill on March 5, 1976 that
would prohibit the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey from
admitting aircraft with noise levels above 108 decibels. This level would
be unattainable by the Concorde as well as most other commercial aircraft.
However, this legislation would exempt aircraft already permitted to land
at Kennedy. The law will not take effect unless similar legislation is passed
by New Jersey.
On December 18, 1975, the United States House of Representatives,
backed by an active anti-Concorde lobby voted, 199-188, in favor of a six-
month ban into all airports except Dulles. This ban would be an amend-
ment to the Airport and Airways Development Act Amendments (HR
9771). However, the Senate on March 25, 1976 defeated three amend-
ments seeking to stop the landing of the Concorde.
NOTES
t See 7 Law. Am. 228-229 (1976).
2NASA defined a criminal offense as "a violation of the Federal Statutes,
Title 18, U.S. Code." Hijacking, smuggling and sabotage were cited as examples.
3NASA defined aircraft accident as "an occurrence set forth in the Code of
Federal Regulations, 49 C.F.R. 830." Midair collisions, flight control malfunctions
or failures, and fatal or serious injuries were cited as examples.
4 Liability and Claim Rules and Practices Investigation, CAB Dockets 19923, et al.
5CAB Order 73-8-33 (August 6, 1973).
6The Board predicated its authority on the language contained in Section 1002
of the Federal Aviation Act wherein the Board is given the power to prescribe rules
and practices.
7The rule contained certain important exceptions as follows: the carrier was not
liable if it could prove (1) it had taken all necessary measures to avoid the loss,
or (2) it was impossible for the carrier to take such measures. (Refer to Rule 30(B),
Liability of Carriers, App. B to I.D., p. 16, col. 2.)
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t The rule will also permit shippers to select "released" coverage and declare
value on different pieces in the same shipment, as an alternative to declaring value
on the whole shipment.
9Section 407 of the Act (49 U.S.C. 1377) provides generally for the filing of
reports, the disclosure of stock ownership, the disclosure of stock ownership by
officers or directors, the form of accounts, and the inspection of accounts and
property. Part 241 of the Board's Regulation (14 C.F.R. 241) sets forth a uniform
system of accounting and reporting requirements for certificated air carriers.
'0 Upon final determination of enforcement allegations adverse to Braniff and
one or more of the Braniff parties, the Bureau requested that the Board institute
a route proceeding to review Braniff's authority, under present management, to
operate generally or, in Latin America, specifically.
IlSee 8 Law. Am. 218-222 (1976) for a review of recently enacted charter air
transportation regulations including the One-Stop Inclusive Tour Charter and the
Special Event Charter.
12 See EDR-294, SPDR-42 and ODR-12.
13Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are included in this grouping.
If any of these countries are prepared to accept the new provisions at the time the
final rule on ABC's is issued they will not be included in this grouping.
14A Supplemental air carrier holds a certificate of public convenience and
necessity authorizing it to engage in supplemental air transportation (14 U.S.C.
1301 (35)). Supplemental air transportation involves the performance of charter air
transportation, including inclusive tour charters (14 U.S.C. 1301 (36)).
t5The value of Transamerica shares to be delivered in stock will approximate
$16,422,262.
16FAA standards require a minimum of five nautical miles horizontal separation
or at least 1,000 feet vertical separation between aircraft flying under radar control
in the continental United States.
17The advanced flight control system will be tied into a computer which will
provide split-second reactions. This will result in a reduction of aerodynamic load
building up on the aircraft's flight control surfaces. The reduced loads will allow
smaller and lighter wings and control surfaces to be used on aircraft.
